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Abstract
When and why do groups participating in mass dissent choose to initiate terrorist campaigns? I argue that groups
involved in civil wars and mass civil resistance might face similar organizational pressures, which encourage the initiation
of terrorism due to higher tactical effectiveness. Internal organizational pressure might depend on leaders’ expectations
of a decline in followers’ commitment with protracted use of mass tactics. This is likely to motivate leaders to initiate
terrorist campaigns to secure organizational survival. External organizational pressures might depend on increasing
dissident campaigns’ fragmentation. This intensifies competition making leaders more likely to initiate terrorism so as to
establish themselves at the forefront of their movements. The findings provide empirical support consistent with my
claims and indicate no significant difference between civil wars and mass civil resistance movements with regards to
these effects. Contrary to the common idea that the use of conventional violence should entail a higher willingness
to engage in illegal violence against non-combatants, this finding suggests that conflict dynamics affect the decision to
initiate terrorism and that terrorist campaigns have a coherent strategic logic across different types of mass dissent.
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Introduction
Existing research on terrorism and conflict has argued
that a number of different structural factors and conflict
dynamics strategically motivate non-state actors to use
terrorist tactics (e.g. Bloom, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita
& Dickson, 2007; Crenshaw, 1981; Kydd & Walter,
2006; Kalyvas, 2003; Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; Li,
2005; Piazza, 2012; Piazza & Walsh, 2010; Schmid,
1992). Also, social movement literature has investigated
whether conflict dynamics motivate dissidents’ tactical
choice (e.g. McAdam, 1982; Reinhart, 2013; Tarrow,
1989; Tilly, 1978; Jenkins & Eckert, 1986; Kriesi
et al., 1995). However, these works consist largely of
theoretical accounts with illustrative examples or unique
case studies and/or consider empirically only dissident
groups that use terrorism without an explicit comparison
with dissident groups that do not use terrorism.
Therefore, on one hand, we know little about relative
causal effects or the generalizability of the various expla-
nations they invoke. On the other hand, we are left
without ground to comprehend which factors affect dis-
sident organizations’ choice of terrorism versus another
dissident strategy. In other words, we cannot infer
whether the strategic logic of terrorist attacks differs from
the strategic logic of other types of collective dissent. A
more consistent empirical test for a rationalist explana-
tion of terrorism must do more than show why terrorism
might appear as an attractive option to a rational non-
state actor under some circumstances – it must take into
account why non-state actors are unable to locate alter-
native dissident strategies or outcomes that they would
prefer to terrorism (see Fearon, 1995). This is the first
aim of this article.
An expanding body of work points to the existing
variation in the use of terrorism by rebel groups – where
‘terrorism’ is defined as the use of indirect attacks
by non-state actors against a government targeting
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non-combatants – in the context of civil wars (Asal et al.,
2012; Findley & Young, 2012a; Sánchez-Cuenca & de
la Calle, 2009). These works have led to a growing body
of empirical studies that investigate the determinants of
intensity and deadliness of terrorist attacks by explicitly
comparing rebels that complement conventional
violence with terrorism to rebels that only use conven-
tional violence. These works have focused on the effect
of state repression, the relative strength of the rebel
groups, the type of regime, and the rebels’ ideology (Polo
& Gleditsch, 2016; Stanton, 2013). Despite the impor-
tant contributions made by these papers, these studies
leave further questions unanswered. In particular, we
lack an explanation for why certain rebel groups in civil
wars initiate terrorism while others do not. This is the
second aim of the article.
Social movement scholars have discussed numerous
case studies that show that groups that use terrorism have
often originated from, or operated within, mass civil
resistance campaigns (e.g. Braungart & Braungart,
1992; Crenshaw, 1992; Della Porta, 1995, 2013;
Neidhardt, 1992; Wieviorka, 1993). But what explains
the emergence of terrorist tactics in some nonviolent
campaigns but not in others? Do similar factors motivate
the initiation of terrorist campaigns in civil wars and civil
resistance alike? In this article, I attempt to explain why
some dissident groups turn to terrorist tactics, as opposed
to continuing their engagement in alternative mass
tactics, while others do not.
To this end, I draw from literature on social move-
ments, civil wars, and terrorism. I systematically investi-
gate whether leaders of organizations that participate in
campaigns of mass dissidence decide to initiate terrorist
campaigns with the aim of preserving the commitment
of their followers and as a strategy of outbidding. In this
way, the article addresses the gaps in the literatures I
discussed above and it provides an answer to the question
of why some dissident groups, but not others, turn to
terrorism, rather than continuing their engagement in
mass dissent.
Mass tactics are defined as a series of observable,
continuous, purposive tactics by non-state actors that
coordinate with each other in pursuit of a common
political objective and involve overt and direct conten-
tious political activities with at least 1,000 participants
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Chenoweth & Lewis,
2013b). These overt and direct contentious political
activities are strikes, marches, public demonstrations,
occupations, obstructions, sit-ins, guerrilla activities,
bombardment of military units, and pitched battles.
Mass dissident tactics require sustained levels of
participation. The numbers of actual participants in
these actions might vary greatly, ranging from a thou-
sand to over a million (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).
Participation in a mass campaign can therefore be ‘low’
relative to other mass campaigns, while still being high in
absolute terms, since even ‘low’ participation involves at
least 1,000 participants.
First, contrary to the common idea that the use of
conventional violence should entail that dissidents are
more willing to engage in illegal violence against non-
combatants (Eck & Hultman, 2007), I argue that groups
involved in mass civil wars and groups involved in mass
civil resistance might face similar conflict dynamics,
which produce organizational pressures that encourage
the initiation of terrorism. This is explained by higher
tactical advantages involved in terrorism when compared
to mass dissent.
Second, social movement scholars have argued that
terrorism is utilized by leaders of dissident organizations
as a means to maintain commitment (Della Porta &
Diani, 1999; Klandermans, 1997; Taylor & Van Dyke,
2004). I argue that leaders expect that their followers will
experience increased frustration, and that their commit-
ment will diminish, when the use of mass tactics is pro-
tracted over time. This expectation imposes internal
organizational pressure to initiate terrorist tactics as a
means to foster commitment and to secure organiza-
tional survival.
Third, although a wide range of literature has argued
that domestic competition increases the likelihood that a
political organization will use violence in an effort to
distinguish itself, there has been contradictory evidence
that increased domestic competition influences the use
of terrorist tactics (Conrad & Greene, 2015; Findley &
Young, 2012b; Nemeth, 2013). I maintain that frag-
mentation within mass dissident campaigns increases
competition between organizations over limited
recourses and encourages the formation of narrow mili-
tant groups that are more likely to initiate terrorism for
gaining support.
Several features make this study unique. First, the
article uses a new dataset that identifies whether terror-
ism occurred and if so whether it was initiated by actors
that participated in mass dissident campaigns and that
shared the campaigns’ broad political goals. The study
therefore provides novel support for the claim that ter-
rorism implies a coherent strategic choice that differs
from the choice to continue engaging in mass dissident
tactics. In fact, studying terrorism onset in the context of
mass dissident campaigns allows us to understand which
conflict dynamics are more likely to affect the choice of
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dissident organizations to initiate terrorism, rather than
continuing mass dissent. Second, this article provides
novel systematic empirical evidence for the original claim
that terrorism, as a means to maintain commitment, is
initiated in prolonged mass dissident campaigns as lead-
ers expect followers to experience increased frustration
over the use of mass dissent. Third, this article provides
novel systematic empirical evidence for the claim that
progressive fragmentation increases the likelihood of ter-
rorism onset. Finally, the findings demonstrate that the
effects of protracted mass dissent and increasing frag-
mentation on the likelihood of terrorism onset do not
differ for civil wars and civil resistance campaigns. This
finding provides evidence for the original claim that the
strategic logic of terrorist tactics is driven by similar con-
strains on dissident organizations using mass dissent
rather than the mere use of conventional armed violence
by dissident organizations.
Terrorism as a strategy and the price
of its alternatives
Table I summarizes how the onset of terrorism varies
across primarily violent and primarily nonviolent mass
dissident campaigns. The table uses new data (described
in detail in the research design below) on any terrorism
occurrence in 189 mass dissident campaigns between
1948 and 2006. Terrorism is defined as the threatened
or actual use of illegal force and violence with the inten-
tion to intimidate or transmit a message to a larger audi-
ence (START, 2012: 6).
While previous literature finds that the percentage of
rebel groups that use terrorism is high,1 Table I demon-
strates that terrorist tactics are by no means ubiquitous in
civil war. In fact, 60% of civil wars do not see any
terrorism. Moreover, terrorist tactics also emerged in
15% of mass civil resistance campaigns. I argue that
groups involved in either civil war or mass civil resistance
might face similar organizational pressures that motivate
the initiation of terrorism. These organizational pressures
for leaders might derive from (1) the expectation that
followers will be increasingly frustrated with mass dissent
over time and (2) the increasing fragmentation of mass
dissident campaigns. The effects of these two dynamics
apply irrespective of whether the mass dissident cam-
paign initially relies primarily on conventional armed
violent or nonviolent methods and stems from the
potentially higher tactical effectiveness of terrorism.
Additionally, the effects of these dynamics apply despite
the potential costs of terrorism resulting from civilian
victimization, which involve the alienation of the con-
stituencies to which the groups belong (Polo & Gle-
ditsch, 2016; Stanton, 2013). This assumption is
based on the following claims.
Unlike mass dissent, terrorism does not aim at impos-
ing direct costs on governments. One might expect that
the use of conventional violence should entail a higher
willingness to engage in violence against non-combatants
(Eck & Hultman, 2007). However, terrorism differs
fundamentally from conventional violence, which
attacks the state’s coercive apparatuses (Bueno de Mes-
quita & Dickson, 2007; Sánchez-Cuenca & de la Calle,
2009; Tilly, 2004). Terrorism is a particularly demand-
ing form of dissent entailing extreme sacrifices and
investments from individual dissidents (Klandermans,
1997). Dissidents engaging in terrorism go underground
and not only isolate themselves from their previous social
lives but also restrict their contacts to a very small
nucleus of dissidents (Della Porta & Diani, 1999). In
fact, organizations that use terrorism are typically struc-
tured in semi-autonomous conglomerations of cells with
a variety of specialties and a single command structure:
columns (White, 2013). The secrecy necessary to carry
out terrorist tactics demands that different dissidents in
the columns are not in contact with each other. In the
long term, the implication of illegally targeting civilians
Table I. Terrorism onset in mass dissident campaigns by primary methods
Primary method of mass dissent
Terrorist campaigns onset
No Yes Total












Table entries are counts; percentages of row totals in parentheses.
1 79% is found in Stanton’s (2013: 1015) sample of 19 rebel groups.
62% is cited by Polo & Gleditsch (2016: 821) in their data
comprising 394 rebel groups.
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is, at best, the exclusion from society. Terrorist attacks
constitute a severe violation of most states’ domestic laws
and they also constitute a violation of international
humanitarian law and international criminal law (ICRC,
2011, 2015).
The core strategic rationale of terrorist attacks is to
signal commitment and resolve to the state and its pop-
ulation, rather than to win outright by brute force or to
leverage the power of the people through civil resistance.
Terrorist campaigns maximize dissidents’ relative power
through their functions of propaganda and pressure
(Kydd & Walter, 2006; Lake, 2003; Sánchez-Cuenca
& de la Calle, 2009). Additionally, targeting non-
combatants and soft targets makes fewer demands on
organizational resources and coordination capabilities
than mass dissident activities. On the one hand, conven-
tional warfare requires armed forces and military control
over large-scale operations, to integrate movement and
indirect fire support, and to combine multiple arms and
units in situations that require a high degree of flexibility
(Biddle & Friedman, 2008; Guevara, 1960; Record,
2007; Tse-tung, 1978). On the other hand, mass civil
resistance requires the ability to communicate effectively
with the social base, media, and civil society, while the
concentrated actions of a large number of volunteers
have to be coordinated. This necessitates more material
resources than terrorist activities may require (Popovic,
Milivojevic & Djinovic, 2006). By contrast, small
groups with few resources and poor capabilities can suc-
cessfully carry out terrorism (Biddle & Friedman, 2008;
Bueno de Mesquita, 2013; Record, 2007). A simple
comparison of participation in terrorist organizations
(Asal, Rethemeyer & Anderson, 2009) and violent dis-
sident campaigns (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013b) reveals
that the average number of active participants in terrorist
groups is only 550 while the average participation in
mass violent campaigns is 5,499. Finally, initiating ter-
rorism might seem cheaper than sustaining mass dissent,
because terrorist tactics entail less risk of retaliation.
While mass dissident activities expose groups to direct
state repression, terrorism allows for concealment.
When and why do participants choose to
initiate terrorist campaigns? Internal and
external organizational pressures
For campaign elites, it is easier to elicit participation in
nonviolent rather than violent mass dissident tactics
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Cunningham, 2013;
Dahl et al., 2014). Conventional armed violence requires
more specialized training than civil resistance and more
expensive equipment, and often involves extreme indi-
vidual moral and physical commitment. By contrast,
physical barriers are lower for nonviolent resistance and
participation is easier to elicit in growing campaigns,
although initial collective action can be difficult and
often suffers from attrition. However, disciplining indi-
vidual followers and coordinating conventional armed
dissent after armed capabilities are developed may be
easier than disciplining mass civil resistance. In civil wars,
organizations tend to have consolidated command and
control structures, making it easier for armed cadres to
control contentious behaviors through mechanisms of
reward and punishment. Additionally, individual parti-
cipants become financially dependent on their organiza-
tion. These factors professionalize dissidents and
facilitate the sustainment of large-scale insurgencies
(Connable & Libicki, 2010).
On the contrary, the leaders of mass nonviolent cam-
paigns rarely have an incentive structure to reward and
punish participants (Dahl et al., 2014). Civil resistance
participants receive no material benefits but also do not
depend financially on the campaign. The integration of
dissidents into civilian life and their power of refusing to
participate in it are the most important sources of power
that groups in civil resistance can leverage against states.
However, the organizations in dissident movements
that are capable of successfully mounting mass civil resis-
tance campaigns exert effective direct influence on dis-
sent activities and, at least initially, can discipline
individuals and coordinate the contentious behavior of
mass nonviolent dissidents. In mass civil resistance, an
effective labor division transforms the diffuse commit-
ments of nonviolent collective actors into clearly defined
roles. This maximizes the capacity of the movements as a
whole to regulate the contentious behavior of their mem-
bers (Gamson & Fireman, 1979). Additionally, effective
coordination through formalized lines of communica-
tion facilitates the ability to carry out a coherent strategy
for organizations within nonviolent mass dissident
movements (Jenkins, 1983). In summary, the more
cohesive a nonviolent movement, the more efficiently
nonviolent discipline is maintained (Pearlman, 2011).
Cohesiveness and effective coordination are also essential
for the ability of violent campaigns to carry out disci-
plined mass armed tactics against the coercive appara-
tuses of states (Tse-tung, 1978).
Organizations that participate in mass dissident cam-
paigns might face internal and external pressures that
encourage groups to resort to terrorism, due to perceived
higher tactical effectiveness when compared to mass dis-
sident tactics. On the one hand, pressure might emerge
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from within the organizations – internal organizational
pressure – and endanger the ability of the organization to
maintain commitment and coordination among its fol-
lowers. On the other hand, pressure might emerge from
within the mass dissident campaign – external organiza-
tional pressure – and it derives from dynamics of frag-
mentation and competition.
Leaders expect that followers will lose commitment
over time due to frustration regarding the ineffectiveness
of mass dissent. In fact, the protracted use of mass dissent
tends to normalize this tactic and determine the loss of its
initially threatening nature for opponent states (Taylor
& Van Dyke, 2004). Mass dissent protracted over time
also signals to participants that this tactic is ineffective in
obtaining the desired political goals. Over time, the nor-
malization of mass dissent and its disclosed incapacity to
produce desired political outcomes motivate partici-
pants’ frustration and dissatisfaction (Della Porta & Tar-
row, 1986; Nepstad, 2015; Pearlman, 2011). The
expected frustration of followers exerts internal organiza-
tional pressure on leaders that aim at ensuring organiza-
tional survival. On the one hand, time is a very precious
resource for leaders of nonviolent mass dissident move-
ments. In their manual on how to successfully manage
nonviolent mass dissent campaigns, Popovic, Milivojevic
& Djinovic (2006), the leaders of the Optor! campaign
against Milosevic, dedicated one entire chapter to stres-
sing the importance of setting realistic goals and dead-
lines to maintain morale. On the other hand, protracted
conventional violence also effectively undermines rebels’
preferences and sympathies (Kalyvas, 2006). To stimu-
late participants’ commitment and ensure organizational
survival, leaders might decide to use more individually
demanding tactics. Particularly demanding forms of dis-
sent are not simply directed to the achievement of short-
term political goals, but also aim to raise consciousness
and to create solidarity (Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004;
Della Porta & Diani, 1999). Carlos Fonseca Amador
(Borge et al., 1982), the leader of the Sandinista National
Liberation Front (SNLF) – an armed organization
against the Nicaraguan Government – claims that the
organization preceding SNLF failed to survive due to the
choice of the wrong method to let followers participate in
the struggle. According to Fonseca, followers had not yet
developed a high revolutionary consciousness and they
became demoralized due to an accumulation of fatigue in
participating in the activities of the ‘regular columns’.
Fonseca explains that once some of these followers
deserted the guerrilla and arrived back in their own areas,
they took part in armed assaults on local government, as
well as execution of known informers. He concludes:
‘this indicates that to a large extent some of the [fol-
lowers] that became demoralized went through that crisis
because they were not organized in the right manner. It
means that they probably should have been irregular
rather than regular guerrilla’ (Borge et al., 1982: 45).
Continuing commitment is effectively achieved when
activists make extraordinary sacrifices for an organization
because the failure of their organization would render
their sacrifices worthless (Klandermans, 1997). As
explained above, terrorist tactics require such extreme
sacrifices and investments. Dissidents initiating terrorism
isolate themselves from their lives and are in contact only
with a small nucleus of dissidents. Additionally, the
implication of illegally targeting civilians is, at best, a
long-term exclusion from society. Individuals in organi-
zations that use terrorism continue their involvement
because surrendering implies ‘losing’ everything they had
already paid as the costs for entering the underground
and targeting civilians (Della Porta, 1992). Social psy-
chological accounts for extremism also point to an indi-
rect link connecting terrorism to a loss of collective
significance through a heightened need for closure (e.g.
Hogg et al., 2007; Webber et. al., 2018). An increased
feeling of collective insignificance motivated by the frus-
tration over protracted mass dissent might augment the
appeal of terrorist tactics because groups engaging in
terrorism embed their action in confidence-affording and
clear-cut views, consensually supported. Therefore, lead-
ers might find terrorist tactics useful as a means of main-
taining commitment and secure the survival of their
organization as the duration of mass dissent increases.
The progressive fragmentation of mass dissident cam-
paigns spurs competition among organizations over
scarce resources and imposes external organizational
pressure to group leaders. Increasing fragmentation is
likely to be affected by an increase of diversity of groups’
demands (Seymour, Bakke & Cunningham, 2016). In
turn, groups in increasingly fragmented campaigns are
more likely to tactically disagree and to compete for
resources as it becomes gradually less likely that the
objectives of individual organizations can be achieved
as part of the broader mass dissident campaign. As addi-
tional new organizations emerge from the same mass
dissident campaigns, increasing competition between the
movements’ organizations increases the likelihood of the
onset of terrorist campaigns. This is because increasing
competition motivates group leaders to differentiate dis-
sident actions from those of other organizations within
the same mass dissident campaigns, which leads to a shift
towards more radicalized activities. In fact, leaders expect
to attract members and media attention with more
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militant actions (Bloom, 2004; Conrad & Greene, 2015;
Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004). Competitive tactical radi-
calization has been observed both in cases of mass civil
resistance and in civil wars as groups vie for prominence
(Clauset et al., 2010; Crenshaw, 1981; Della Porta,
2013; Della Porta & Tarrow, 1986; Pearlman, 2011;
Kydd & Walter, 2006). For example, Enrico Fenzi, one
of the ideologues and leaders of the Red Brigades, an
organization that emerged from the New Left mass dis-
sident campaign in Italy, explains the choice of initiating
terrorist tactics as follows: ‘For the Red Brigades to be
protagonists meant to take a more active role in the
upheaval and this, in turn, to be protagonist meant to
initiate the use of terrorist violence. In other words, to be
protagonists it was necessary to use an additional disrup-
tive charge’.2 Leaders that are faced with external orga-
nizational pressure deriving from increasing competition
within the mass movement might decide to initiate ter-
rorist campaigns to outbid rival organizations. Terrorism
as outbidding aims to convince the public of the greater
worthiness of the perpetrators relative to other dissident
actors. This logic is explained by a statement of Ahmad-
Zadeh (1971: 2), a founder of the Iranian People’s
Fadaee organization, which emerged from a mass non-
violent campaign against the Shah regime in Iran: ‘[w]e
certainly do not expect the direct support of the people
immediately [ . . . ]. Conscious of the correctness of the
armed struggle, influenced by it and with the moral
support of the people, these groups take up arms and
extend the struggle, thereby increasing the possibilities of
material support from the people’. Increasing fragmenta-
tion also divides mass dissident campaigns into progres-
sively smaller subgroups that are well suited for
terrorism, because they can pursue radical agendas that
large organizations cannot maintain. In addition, small
organizations have a comparative advantage in using ter-
rorist tactics, since they lack sufficient capabilities to hurt
the state directly using armed violence or exerting the
power of the people. As explained above, terrorist tactics
require fewer human and material organizational
resources than either mass civil resistance or conven-
tional armed violence. Hence, I claim that increasing
fragmentation within mass dissident movements raises
the competition among organizations and imposes exter-
nal organizational pressure on leaders to differentiate
dissident actions in a way to outbid others. Additionally,
the optimal strategy, for these groups with militant
character and limited capabilities, to gain support and
put themselves in the forefront of their movements is to
initiate terrorist campaigns.
Hypothesis 1: The onset of terrorism is more likely the
longer a mass dissident campaign lasts.
Hypothesis 2: The onset of terrorism is more likely
with increasing fragmentation within the mass dissi-
dent campaign.
Research design and data
Building on the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and
Outcomes 2.0 (NAVCO) data (Chenoweth & Lewis,
2013a), I have compiled a new dataset on any terrorism
occurrence in 189 mass dissident campaigns between
1948 and 2006 (see Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 3 for
NAVCO’s definition of mass dissident campaigns).
I identified terrorist attacks by dissident actors or groups
engaging in mass dissent and who share the same broad
political goals of the mass dissident campaigns (see
‘Dependent variable’). The unit of analysis is the mass
dissident-campaign-year. The campaign is a more appro-
priate unit of analysis than groups, because it makes it
possible to take into account changes in participants’
strategic context. Additionally, focusing on mass dissi-
dent campaigns as collective actors makes it possible to
aggregate groups’ characteristics and avoids artificially
increasing the number of observations.
NAVCO 2.0 is limited to dissident campaigns where
the underlying incompatibilities are regime change, insti-
tutional reform, major policy change, territorial seces-
sion, or greater autonomy and anti-occupation in
independent states. The findings pertain only to ‘cam-
paigns with maximalist goals and a high level of sustained
mobilization over time’ (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013b:
420). See the Online appendix for a discussion on the
cases of the Madagascan active forces mass civil resistance
and the Islamic Salvation Front mass civil resistance.
NAVCO 2.0 classifies mass dissident campaigns as
nonviolent if this is the primary resistance method and
participation is limited to unarmed civilians (Chenoweth
& Lewis, 2013b: 418). In contrast, campaigns are clas-
sified as primarily violent when dissidents use armed
force and the campaign has generated at least 1,000
battle-related deaths per year. These are ‘ideal categoriza-
tions’ and the primary mass tactic does not exclude par-
ticipants’ simultaneous use of other tactics, so long as
they do not become dominant (Chenoweth & Stephan,
2011: 12). Battle-related deaths accounted for in violent
dissident campaigns do not include deaths due to attacks
2 Translated from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼hHFkJ
ASG9-4.
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deliberately directed against civilians. Although battle-
related deaths include collateral damage in the form of
civilians killed in crossfire, my dataset on terrorist attacks
considers only deliberate targeting of non-combatants.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable indi-
cating onsets of terrorist campaigns. Terrorist campaign
onset refers to the first year of a dissident campaign in
which participants begin to systematically use terrorist
tactics: at least three terrorist attacks within a year form
the first terrorist campaign. The intensity of terrorist
attacks is likely to differ across mass dissident methods
after the onset due to the existence of armed resources
and know-how in the case of civil wars. However, actors’
rationale for initiating terrorism might be driven by a
similar strategic calculus and three terrorist attacks
within a year in the absence of civil wars can be consid-
ered a relevant threat to domestic stability.
I used the Global Terrorism Database’s (GTD) three
basic coding rules and three additional criteria to identify
terrorist attacks (START, 2012): attacks must be inten-
tional, entail use of violence or the threat of violence,
aimed at political, economic or social goals, have the
intention to coerce, intimidate or transmit a message
to a larger audience than the immediate victims, violate
the prohibition of international humanitarian law to tar-
get civilians or non-combatants, and be perpetrated by
non-state actors. Additionally, I included only terrorist
attacks carried out by actors engaging in mass dissent and
which share the broad political goals of the dissident
campaigns. When perpetrators are known, I engaged
in in-depth case research using scholarly literature and
news media reports from Lexis Nexis to verify that orga-
nizations that choose terrorism participated in mass dis-
sent. Participation in mass civil resistance is established
when groups (1) contributed to coordinate the emer-
gence of nonviolent mass movements and/or (2) took
part in the broader coalition waging mass civil unrest.
Among the groups engaging in terrorism in nonvio-
lent campaigns, there are cases of organizations that
previously participated in large-scale civil war (such
as the IRA, the Free Papua Movement, the CPN-M/
UPF, and New People’s Army). I considered these
organizations as responsible for the onset of new ter-
rorist campaigns, because the existence of resources to
target the state’s coercive apparatuses makes the initia-
tion of violence against non-combatants and other soft
targets a clear tactical choice. The Online appendix
summarizes the patterns of participation in and
coordination of mass civil resistance for all groups car-
rying out terrorist attacks.
Similarly, among the groups engaging in terrorism in
violent campaigns, there are cases of organizations pre-
viously engaging in mass civil resistance (e.g. the
LTTE). The rationale behind including these groups
in the analysis and considering them as responsible for
the onset of new terrorist campaigns rests on the
assumption that the mobilization of conventional vio-
lence against the state constitutes a substantial change
in the strategic context for organizations previously
engaged in mass nonviolent dissent.
When the perpetrators of terrorist attacks are
unknown, I engaged in in-depth case-by-case research
using the GTD advanced online research tool and news
media reports from Lexis Nexis to verify that attacks
targeted the political opposition to civil resistance cam-
paigns. In 2005, for example, nonviolent mass dissent
was waged against Hezbollah’s Syrian-friendly govern-
ment (Cedar Revolution). Terrorist attacks that targeted
Hezbollah officials, pro-Syrian Lebanese politicians, and
Syrian citizens in Lebanon provide evidence that actors
who share the broad political goals of the civil resistance
engaged in terrorism even if the name of the perpetrator’s
group is unknown. The Online appendix presents evi-
dence of the identity of broad political goals between
perpetrators and civil resistance campaigns.
I obtained detailed information on the systematic use
of terrorism in mass dissident campaigns from GTD as
of the 1970s. Prior to 1970, I coded the data on terror-
ism in mass dissent from Lexis Nexis news reports, fol-
lowing the criteria outlined above. To obtain the data on
terrorism in mass dissident campaigns with domestic
political goals, I followed Endlers, Sandler & Gaibul-
loev’s (2011) protocol to extract domestic terrorist
attacks from the GTD. Terrorist strategies must have
direct consequences for the venue country, its institu-
tions, citizens, property, and policies.
Some dissident campaigns target foreign states and
attacks thus fall under Endlers, Sandler & Gaibulloev’s
(2011) definition of transnational terrorism. I manually
coded these as domestic attacks, given their location and
targets. For example, a terrorist attack perpetrated by
Palestinian nationals targeting Israeli or Palestinian
nationals in Israel during the mass dissident campaign
for the Palestinian liberation territories is thus counted as
a domestic attack. However, a terrorist attack perpetrated
by Palestinians against US nationals abroad is considered
fully transnational and thus is dropped from the data,
even if it furthered the cause of the mass dissident cam-
paign for the liberation of the Palestinians.
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The dataset covers 1,485 campaign-year observa-
tions,3 in which 275 years had terrorist attacks. To
restrict attention to terrorism onsets or first use only, I
dropped subsequent ongoing years where terrorism is
used again in a mass dissident campaign. Subsequent
years of terrorism are dropped from the sample because
the incentives for and constraints on continuing or end-
ing terrorist campaigns may be different from the incen-
tives for avoiding terrorism before it begins and
dynamics which may lead to its onset. Including on-
going terrorism would mean modeling terrorism onsets
over and over again and could thus bias my findings
(Bennett & Stam, 2000: 660–662).
Core explanatory variables
My core explanatory variables are taken from the
NAVCO 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a). The
first mass dissident campaign characteristic of interest for
my purposes is Mass dissident campaign duration. I count
the years elapsed since the start of the individual mass
dissident campaign. Figure 1 shows the frequency distri-
bution of the values of Mass dissident campaign duration.
In the sample of dissident campaigns used here, civil
resistance lasts on average 5.7 years, while the average
length of violent campaigns is 11.6 years.
The second variable of interest proxies increasing
levels of fragmentation within mass dissident cam-
paigns by coding the number of Additional organiza-
tions emerging in a given year from within a given mass
dissident campaign. It is extracted from NAVCO 2.0
and measures the ‘[n]umber of new named organiza-
tions involved in the campaign in that particular
year’(Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 6). Figure 2 shows
the frequency distribution of the value of Additional
organizations. The average number of new organiza-
tions in the sample of dissident campaigns used here
is one. In very few campaigns do more than three new
organizations emerge per year.
Potential confounders
To assess accurately the effect of protracted use of mass
dissident tactics and increasing fragmentation on the
likelihood of terrorist campaigns onset, and to ensure
that their effects do not reflect just the primary tactic
of mass dissent, I include a binary variable on the
primary campaign method of mass resistance: Primary
method of mass dissent. Disciplining and coordinating
conventional armed dissent after armed capabilities are
developed may be easier than disciplining mass civil
resistance. Therefore, the effects of protracted mass dis-
sent and increasing fragmentation might be driven
exclusively by the use of conventional violence or mass
civil resistance, respectively. As explained above, mass
dissident campaigns are considered nonviolent (1)
based on the primacy of nonviolent resistance methods
(Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013b: 418) and violent (0)
when participants use primarily physical force through
the use of arms.
Organizations that use mass dissident tactics with rel-
atively low participation might decide to initiate terror-
ism because it requires fewer dissidents and it credibly
signals their willingness to endure the struggle (Biddle &
Friedman, 2008; Bueno de Mesquita, 2013; Record,
2007). Lower participation is also a potential confounder
for the effect of prolonged use of mass dissent if loss of
followers’ commitment itself, rather than leaders’
Figure 1. Distribution of mass dissident campaign duration
Figure 2. Distribution of additional organizations
3 See Online appendix, ‘NAVCO’s Double Counts’.
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expectation of it, affects the likelihood of terrorism onset.
Therefore, I control for Size of mass dissent participation
from NAVCO 2.0 (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 9).
A third obvious potential confounder is State repres-
sion. I extract repression from NAVCO 2.0 (Chenoweth
& Lewis, 2013b). Groups that use mass dissent tactics
openly confront the coercive apparatuses of states on the
ground. Extreme physical repression against violent and
nonviolent mass dissent raises the risk of death, injuries,
or imprisonment for participants. To decrease the risk of
being targeted by repression, leaders of dissident groups
may decide to go underground and to further decrease
the costs of direct retaliation associated with targeting
state police and the military, participant organizations
may initiate terrorism. High repression might push lead-
ers to develop expectations about followers’ loss of com-
mitment and therefore motivate them to initiate terrorist
tactics to ensure organizational survival. Finally, high
repression might motivate tactical disagreement among
organizations and motivate competition among groups.
Democracies are held by some to provide a favorable
environment for the development of terrorism (Eubank
& Weinberg, 1994; Li, 2005; Schmid, 1992). Democ-
racies may also be better equipped to absorb challenging
extra-institutional political demands into regular political
procedures, thereby reducing the duration of mass dis-
sent. I thus control for Democracy in the previous year via
a dichotomous item for countries with values of 6 or
above on the Polity2 score from the Polity IV Project
(Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2014).
Widespread poverty may create grievances and a large
pool of potential recruits for dissident activities. Low
income tends to make large-scale conventional armed
conflict more feasible (Collier, 2000), thereby increasing
the duration of and participation in conflicts. Such grie-
vances may also affect the resort to terrorism (Crenshaw,
1981). I thus control for a country’s GDP per capita
(logged) using data from Gleditsch (2002).
For states with a large population, effective security
measures are difficult to implement. This, in turn, makes
the state vulnerable to terrorism. Large population size
might be correlated with higher ethnic and ideological
diversity. If this is reflected in the composition of mass
dissident campaigns it might make mass dissident cam-
paigns more likely to fragment. Therefore, I also include
a measure of Total population (logged) from Gleditsch
(2002). Countries with a larger population experience
more domestic terrorism (Savun & Phillips, 2009).
Finally, rebel groups with political goals that address
greater constituencies are likely to use less terrorism
because of the risk of alienating potential followers and
to minimize public backlash. Political goals that are
connected to claims of ethnically homogeneous groups,
such as territorial secession and greater autonomy, might
foster consensus about the value of public goods, facil-
itating the operation of selective incentives to ensure
their provision while promoting in-group cooperation
through social sanctions (Seymour, Bakke & Gallagher,
2016). Consequently, mass dissident campaigns with
‘territorial secession’ and ‘greater autonomy’ as political
goals might be less prone to fragmentation than mass
dissident campaigns with ‘significant institutional
reform’, ‘regime change’, and ‘anti-occupation’ as polit-
ical goals. Therefore, I included campaigns’ political
goals to check that the nature of the goals of dissident
campaigns does not drive the effect of fragmentation.
I extracted information on campaigns’ political goals
from NAVCO 2.0 (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a).4
Empirical analysis
I estimate logistic regression models on terrorism onset
or the first new year in which terrorism occurs during
mass dissident campaigns. I include a cubic polynomial
approximation using a variable on the years since the last
terrorist attack to correct for time dependence, since
terrorist campaigns are more likely to recur when there
is a recent history of terrorism (Carter & Signorino,
2010). Finally, I cluster standard errors by country, since
the variance may differ systematically across states.
Table II presents three model specifications. Model 1
includes the two main explanatory variables and the
principal potential confounders and Model 2 accounts
for the effects of structural factors, while Model 3 adds to
the analysis the control variables related to the political
goals of mass dissident campaigns. I dropped 111 obser-
vations in Models 2 and 3. This is due to missing values
of GDP per capita and to the one-year lag for democracy.
All Models in Table II show that the effect of Mass dissent
duration is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01
level. The coefficient of Additional organizations is also
positive and significant at the 0.1 level in Models 1 and 2
and at the 0.05 level in Model 3. These results are robust
to clustering standard errors by campaign or including
the independent variables separately (see Online appen-
dix, Tables IV–V). In Model 3, every additional year of
mass dissent increases the probability of terrorism onset
by 3%, and every additional organization emerging from
mass dissident campaigns is linked with an increase in
4 See Online appendix, Tables II–III for descriptive statistics and
collinearity diagnostics.
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the probability of terrorism onset of almost 15%, hold-
ing the other variables constant at their means.
To verify that the values of Size of mass dissent partic-
ipation do not influence the coefficients of the main
explanatory variables, I consider various alternative par-
ticipation measures. The findings remain virtually iden-
tical to those presented in Table II when these alternative
measures are included (Online appendix, Tables VII–X).
There is no evidence of a curvilinear relationship of Mass
dissent duration and Additional organizations with the
likelihood of Terrorism onset, and there is no evidence
that the inclusion of Repression on mass dissent is driving
the findings for the core independent variables (Online
appendix, Tables XI–XIII). Additionally, the effect of
Additional organizations lagged by one year is not robust,
which suggests that current increasing fragmentation
rather than increasing fragmentation in the past posi-
tively affects terrorism onset (Online appendix, Table
XIV). The findings for the main explanatory variables
remain consistent also when using Polity2 score (t–1)
from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers,
2014) as an alternative measure for democracy (Online
appendix, Table XV).
Figure 3 displays how the predicted probability of ter-
rorism onset increases for every additional year of mass
dissent, holding other covariates at their means. This is
consistent with the expectation that terrorism onset is more
likely as leaders expect followers’ loss of commitment with
protracted use of mass dissent. The 95% confidence inter-
vals get larger as very few mass dissident campaigns persist
over 26 years and the number of observations decreases.
Figure 4 shows how the predicted probability of ter-
rorism onset increases with any additional organization,
holding other covariates at their means. Also in this case,
the 95% confidence intervals get larger as very few mass
dissident campaigns experience the emergence of more
than three new additional organizations in one year.
As expected, Table II suggests that democracies pro-
vide a favorable environment for the use of terrorism.
This finding remains consistent when using the lagged
Table II. Determinants of terrorist campaigns onset
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Terrorism onset Terrorism onset Terrorism onset
Mass dissent duration 0.082** 0.049** 0.045**
(0.013) (0.018) (0.015)
Additional organizations 0.190y 0.235y 0.251*
(0.109) (0.120) (0.109)
Size of mass dissent participation –0.222 –0.004 –0.044
(0.184) (0.174) (0.189)
Repression on mass dissent 0.858** 1.048** 0.872**
(0.231) (0.353) (0.286)
Primary method of mass dissent –0.256 –0.279 –0.567
(0.382) (0.441) (0.495)
Population (log) –0.449* –0.312
(0.188) (0.222)
Real GDP per capita (log) 0.443y 0.419
(0.234) (0.275)












Observations 826 715 715
yp < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included.
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regular Polity2 score (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2014)
(Online appendix, Table XV). The findings for the other
structural variables (population and GDP per capita) are
not robust across the models. The coefficients for Regime
change, Significant institutional reform, and Anti-
occupation are positive and significant in Table II and
robust across the tables in the Online appendix. This
suggests that mass dissident campaigns with political
goals that do not denote homogeneity in followers’ eth-
nicity or ideology are more likely to be more prone to
terrorism onset.
Most importantly, Primary method of mass dissent is
not significant across all models.5 The results show that
the intercept of nonviolent mass dissent does not differ
significantly from the intercept of civil war. I estimated
nested models for all models in Table II with interaction
terms between Primary method of mass dissent and signif-
icant core explanatory variables (Online appendix,
Tables XVI–XVII).
In these specifications, the coefficient of each para-
meter shows the effect for conventional civil wars, while
the coefficient of the interaction terms between Primary
method of mass dissent and the other parameter is the
effect of the parameter tested on mass civil resistance. I
then test whether the effect of each parameter for mass
civil resistance differs from the effect of the same para-
meter for civil wars. No significant statistical difference
exists for the effect of Mass dissent duration on the like-
lihood of Terrorism onset across violent and nonviolent
methods (Online appendix, Figures 1–3). Furthermore,
no significant statistical difference exists for the effect of
Additional organizations on the likelihood of Terrorism
onset across mass civil resistance and civil war (Online
appendix, Figures 4–6). These findings remain robust
when I use lagged regular Polity2 score (Online appendix,
Table XVIII, Tests 7–8).
Since the estimates are uncertain due to variation in
the data and mode uncertainty, I simulate 10,000 draws
based on the estimates of all nested models of Tables
XVI–XVII (Online appendix). The distribution of the
results for both independent variables across large-scale
conventional civil wars and mass civil resistance is virtu-
ally identical (Online appendix, Figures 7–12). The
effects of the main explanatory variables also do not
differ when allowing the slopes of all other covariates
to differ across groups, that is, splitting the sample into
violent and nonviolent campaigns across all models in
Table II (Tests 9–14). The findings also remain consis-
tent when re-estimating the core models excluding from
the sample self-coded terrorist data (Online appendix,
Table XIX, Figures 13–14). Finally, I can also reject the
Figure 3. Predicted probability of terrorist campaigns onsets by
duration (Table II, Model 3)
This figure plots the predicted probability of terrorism campaigns
onset (y axis) at different values of mass dissident campaign duration
(x axis) keeping all the other covariates at their means. The black line
corresponds to cases of large-scale conventional civil war. The dashed
lines indicate the bounds of a 95% confidence interval for these
predicted probabilities.
Figure 4. Predicted probability of terrorist campaigns onsets by
number of additional dissident organizations (Table II, Model
3)
This figure plots the predicted probability of terrorism campaigns
onset (y axis) at different numbers of additional dissident organiza-
tions (x axis) keeping all the other covariates at their means. The black
line corresponds to cases of large-scale conventional civil war. The
dashed lines indicate the bounds of a 95% confidence interval for
these predicted probabilities.
5 The effects of the main explanatory variables on the likelihood of
Terrorism occurrence are virtually identical. However, Mass civil
resistance has a significant negative effect on Terrorism occurrence.
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hypothesis of non-difference between the effects of the
main independent variables (Online appendix, Test 15).
In summary, the effects of the covariates of interest do
not change depending on control variables, a vast series
of model specification, Monte Carlo simulation, and
data restriction. I find robust evidence that longer mass
dissent and additional organizations increase the likeli-
hood of terrorism onset. Additionally, the findings show
that these effects are robust for no statistical difference
across civil war or mass civil resistance. In other words,
the onset of terrorist campaigns appears to be a consis-
tent strategic decision across organizations participating
in different mass contentious activities.
Conclusion
The fact that terrorism can emerge from both violent and
nonviolent mass movements calls for explanations
grounded in the constraints on mass dissident activities
that motivate participant groups to choose indirect illegal
violence against civilians and other targets, rather than
continuing their involvement in mass dissident cam-
paigns. The empirical analysis in this article allows us
to draw conclusions on the conflict dynamics that are
more likely to affect dissident organizations’ choice to
initiate terrorism versus continuing mass dissent. The
empirical findings provide strong and robust support for
my claims that terrorist campaigns are initiated (1) as a
means to maintain followers’ commitment, as leaders
expect increasing frustration and decreasing commit-
ment with mass tactics the longer mass dissident cam-
paigns last; and (2) as a means to outbid other
organizations and efficiently exploit organizational
recourses in situations in which fragmentation increases
the competition within a mass dissident campaign.
The results are also consistent with my claim that the
choice to begin terrorist campaigns is due to the similar
dynamics that impose internal and external organiza-
tional pressure for organizations in mass violent and
nonviolent campaigns. I show robust indications of sig-
nificant non-difference in the effects of longer mass dis-
sent and increasing fragmentation on terrorism onset
across different primary methods of mass contention.
In summary, it emerges that dissident groups for which
the legal expression of opposition is blocked prefer the
initiation of terrorist campaigns to the continuation of
mass dissent tactics when these more direct methods are
perceived as ineffective to secure organizational survival
and gain prominence within the campaign.
This article suggests a number of relevant extensions
and topics for future investigations. For example, more
could be done to investigate the role that the nature of
the groups and the ideology and goals of dissident cam-
paigns play with respect to the likelihood of terrorism
onset. Systematic work on the effect of ideology and
goals on terrorist tactics has so far been limited to con-
texts of civil war and terrorism intensity. Future research
may also focus on the emergence of more spontaneous
and less organized types of dissident activities, such as
riots and mobs, and on whether and under which con-
ditions mass dissident campaigns with tactical variation
are more or less likely to succeed. In general, the findings
highlight the utility of empirically integrating the study
of different types of contentious political behaviors for a
more comprehensive and systematic understanding of
the dynamics that motivate dissident organizations’ tac-
tical choices. Although mass dissent and terrorism are by
no means the only choices available to dissidents, an
integrated approach to their study provides a starting
point for understanding the choice of specific tactics
with respect to other strategic alternatives.
Replication data
The Online appendix, dataset, codebook, and do-files
for the empirical analysis in this article can be found at
http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets.
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